This final article in the series examines what is now at stake when constitutional foreign policy is misunderstood or poorly communicated. It argues that South Africa’s challenge is no longer only diplomatic credibility, but whether constitutional states can still defend a rules-based international order in an era increasingly shaped by force, coercion, and unilateral power.
South Africa’s diplomatic moment is no longer approaching… It has arrived.
In a world where military power, economic coercion, and strategic intimidation increasingly replace law and institutions, it is no longer enough for states to be constitutionally correct. They must also be strategically persuasive.
“Principle without projection is no longer neutral. It is vulnerable.”
This is the reality facing South Africa in 2026. It is also the reality facing constitutional democracies everywhere.
Across the globe, force is speaking louder than law, with rules-based order under pressure.
South Africa’s hosting of BRICS-Plus naval exercises with China, Russia, and Iran triggered immediate diplomatic backlash from the United States, despite Pretoria’s insistence that the drills were aimed at maritime security and economic stability. The controversy was not about legality alone. It was about perception, alignment, and power. As Bischoff (2003) explained, pluralist middle powers are especially vulnerable to misreading when global politics hardens into binary camps.
At the same time, the United States has increasingly relied on overt military signalling abroad, including unilateral action in Venezuela and forceful rhetoric around strategic territories such as Greenland. European allies responded not because war was imminent, but because ambiguity itself has become dangerous. These responses reflect a deeper structural shift in international order.
As Reus-Smit (1997) demonstrates, when the constitutional structure of international society changes, authority migrates from shared legal norms to power-based ordering. Legitimacy is no longer derived primarily from law, but from visible capacity and speed.
“When power speaks first, law is forced to explain itself later.”
In such a system, patience for legal explanation is short, leaving constitutional states exposed.
Constitutional democracies are deliberately designed to restrain power. Military action is subject to oversight. Foreign policy must be justified, debated, and defended. These features exist to prevent abuse and protect democratic legitimacy.
As Koh (1990) has shown, this restraint is not a weakness. It is the defining feature of constitutional government.
Yet, in a world where diplomacy increasingly communicates through force, restraint is easily misread as hesitation. Silence is interpreted as indecision. Legal complexity is dismissed as evasion.
“Constitutional restraint is increasingly mistaken for unreliability.”
This misreading is not merely reputational. It has material consequences, most importantly the economic cost of misinterpretation.
Markets respond to signals, made by states, not footnotes.
When states are perceived as strategically ambiguous, uncertainty is priced in immediately. Investors hesitate. Borrowing costs rise. Trade partners hedge their bets. As Drezner (2015) demonstrated, economic actors respond to perceived geopolitical alignment long before any formal sanction or legal dispute arises.
South Africa cannot assume that constitutional virtue will shield it from these effects. In a securitised global economy, economic confidence depends on geopolitical clarity.
“Markets price uncertainty faster than they reward constitutional virtue.”
If constitutional foreign policy is not clearly articulated and consistently projected, it becomes economically costly, even when legally sound.
The Obligation to Act Strategically
South Africa has an obligation to its people to act strategically. This moment within geo politics imposes an obligation, not a choice.
Constitutional states cannot rely on law to speak for itself. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) show, norms only constrain behaviour when they are visible, reiterated, and socially reinforced. Silence accelerates norm erosion rather than preserving legitimacy.
For South Africa, this means a shift from reactive explanation to proactive articulation.
Legal reasoning must be presented at the moment decisions are taken, not after criticism emerges. Defence activity, diplomatic messaging, and constitutional justification must move together. Non-alignment must be framed as a standing doctrine rooted in international law, not an improvised defence when challenged.
Communication is no longer ancillary to statecraft. It is central to diplomatic credibility and economic stability.
No constitutional state can do this alone. Democratic states globally need to act collectively to preserve the rules-based order.
As Acharya (2014) argues, in a multipolar order, normative influence survives only where states translate principle into collective leverage. Coalitions of constitutional democracies, grounded in shared legal commitments, remain one of the few effective counterweights to unilateral power. This is where South Africa needs to position itself.
If constitutional states fail to coordinate, the rules-based order will not erode slowly. It will be overwritten.
“If constitutional states do not defend the rules, the rules will not defend them.”
Democracy is the real stake we stand to lose, this is not merely a debate about foreign policy technique. It is about democracy itself.
Rules-based order exists to protect weaker states from coercion, to limit the use of force, and to ensure that power is exercised within constraints. When those rules weaken internationally, domestic constitutionalism becomes harder to sustain. External power politics normalise internal erosion.
South Africa’s choices therefore carry significance beyond its borders. If constitutional states retreat into silence or ambiguity, they reinforce the very dynamics that undermine democracy globally.
“South Africa needs to act or it risks being overwritten.”
South Africa does not need to abandon its Constitution to survive this moment, it needs to use it deliberately.
The rules-based order will not save itself. Democracy will not defend itself through good intentions alone. Constitutional states must act, speak, and coordinate with urgency, clarity, and confidence.
South Africa’s task is not defensive. It is constructive: to show that law still matters, restraint still matters, and constitutional democracy still has a voice in global affairs.
If constitutional states fail to do this now, the world they inherit will not be governed by rules at all, but by whoever speaks loudest and moves first, history has taught us that the loudest voice is not always the smartest.
That is not a future South Africa, or any democracy, can afford.
* Sherwyn Sean Cupido-Weaich is a legal and governance professional and researcher specialising in constitutional governance, public-sector reform, and the application of data and artificial intelligence to institutional accountability. He holds a BA (Hons) in Business and Law (UK) and is completing an Executive MBA in Data Analytics (UK), combining legal analysis with data-driven approaches to policy design and state capacity.
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of or Independent Media.
